Telephone insults and civil liability: the Italian Supreme Court reduces the scope of offence in family conflicts

by Laura Catania

Verbal abuse by an ex-spouse is not compensable if, considering the hostile and reciprocal nature of the exchanges, the judge excludes its actual harmful impact. The mere presence of minor children is, by itself, irrelevant. In family conflicts, the offensive nature of statements must be assessed in light of the relational context and their actual ability to harm the honour and reputation of the person targeted.

A mere harshness of tone is not sufficient to constitute a compensable civil wrong: this is what the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) reaffirmed in judgment no. 21026/2026.

Can a telephone call really constitute a civil insult when the conflict has already escalated?

Supreme Court judgment n. 21026/2026 originated from an application under Article 702-bis of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, through which a woman sought compensation for damages arising from the alleged unlawful conduct resulting from insulting statements made by her former husband during a telephone call on 17 February 2018.

Specifically, the phone call, which was also heard by their minor children, concerned the payment of extraordinary expenses. The statements addressed to the woman, “You are a bad person. You need to go to work. You are a terrible mother. Never call me again”, were alleged by the claimant to have harmed her personal dignity and her image as a mother and educator, causing her significant psychological distress.

The Court of Viterbo dismissed the claim, finding that the alleged unlawful conduct had not been proven and, in any event, that the disputed statements were not defamatory or insulting in light of the conflictual context and the mutual accusations concerning the children’s extraordinary expenses. The Rome Court of Appeal fully upheld the decision.

The woman appealed to the Supreme Court.

Are words sufficient, or is it the context that determines their actual offensive nature?

Declaring the appeal inadmissible, the Supreme Court reaffirmed an established principle: harm to honour and reputation cannot be assessed solely on the basis of the subjective perception of the person who considers themselves offended, but must be evaluated according to objective criteria, consistent with prevailing social standards at the relevant historical moment and with the context in which the statements were made.

In the case examined, the Court of Appeal had correctly identified three decisive circumstances:

  • the existence of a serious and long-standing conflict between the parties;
  • the heated and confrontational nature of the discussion;
  • the reciprocal personal accusations that emerged during the conversation.

These elements made it possible to exclude any concrete ability of the disputed expressions to reduce the woman’s standing in the eyes of society.

When does a statement truly cross the threshold of civil liability?

The ruling reaffirmed that, following the decriminalisation of the offence of insult (ingiuria) in 2016, civil liability requires a strict assessment of whether the statements are actually capable of harming honour and reputation. The Supreme Court confirmed that civil liability cannot automatically arise from the mere use of unpleasant, offensive, or inappropriate words. It is necessary to determine whether the expressions are genuinely capable of infringing a constitutionally protected personality right.

This principle is particularly significant in family disputes, where the strong emotional component and frequent escalation of relationships make it necessary to distinguish between relational conflict and a genuine civil wrong.

In other words, the legal system does not grant compensatory relevance to every inappropriate verbal outburst arising within a deteriorated relationship.

The judgment also addressed the issue of children being present during conversations: the Supreme Court confirmed that the presence of minors may be relevant with regard to the subjective element of the dissemination of the alleged offence, but only on the condition that the words used have already exceeded the minimum threshold of offensiveness recognised by the legal system. If that requirement is not met, the fact that the children witnessed the conversation is, in itself, irrelevant for the purposes of establishing civil liability.

The decision fits within an approach aimed at preserving the proper function of civil liability, preventing it from being used as a punitive tool in family environments characterised by chronic tensions.